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he Treaty of Lisbon entered into force five months ago, introducing six major institutional 
innovations that were supposed to make the Union more efficient, more transparent and 
increase its legitimacy. So, how is the new system shaping up? 
Positioning of the European Council President 
The first European Council meetings with Herman Van Rompuy at the helm offer an indication of 
how this new institution is going to take shape. The president himself seems to interpret his role of 
President of the European Council (POTEC) as more of a facilitator than a leader. This choice 
should be regarded rather positively. Initial expectations of Van Rompuy were not high in many 
capitals of Europe, and true leadership can only be founded on the trust European Council members 
have in their president. 
The POTEC introduces much-needed elements of longer-term stability to the European Council 
agenda and could play an important part as mediator in situations of conflict. This could already be 
observed during the spring European Council meetings. Van Rompuy’s aim to focus the activities 
of the institution on economic governance could prove risky, however, if day-to-day crises 
continue to dominate the agenda of this new institution.  
The close relationship between the POTEC and the European Commission president (they have 
weekly meetings) should also be regarded positively, as smooth cooperation between the Union 
institutions is necessary for successful action. The process of positioning the president vis-à-vis 
other actors (especially towards the rotating presidency and the Commission) is underway. So far it 
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has largely been successful for the POTEC, but future setbacks cannot be excluded, especially with 
a stronger and better organised rotating presidency than the current one. A modus vivendi will need 
to be arrived at, as both the Spanish and Belgian EU presidencies are exceptional (Madrid is the 
first member state to lead a Lisbon rotating presidency, and it will be the objective of the Belgian 
rotating presidency to strengthen the POTEC). Tensions will most likely be detected in the area of 
foreign policy, and with the Commission and/or the High Representative for EU Foreign Policy. 
One promising element is that the arrival of a permanent president of the most intergovernmental 
of EU institutions brings an element of collective thinking. Among 27 wolves fighting for their 
national interests there is now a mediator trying to convince the group to see Europe as one unity. 
The threat is that we may witness a ‘European-Councilisation’ of European politics, which might 
mean an inflation of the institution’s meetings and a marginalisation and subversion of other 
institutions (most notably the Council of Ministers, in particular the General Affairs Council, and 
the European Commission). If a stronger European Council means increased 
intergovernmentalisation of the EU – it does not necessarily entail a weakening of the Union. There 
are policy areas, such as economic governance, which can be only addressed by this institution. 
Shaky start for the European Foreign Policy Chief 
To be fair, Catherine Ashton does not have an easy life. She was under fire from day 1 in post, first 
for her lack of experience, then for her weak performance, especially in the aftermath of the Haitian 
earthquake. The Foreign Policy Chief, or High Representative, needs time she does not have. In the 
first period she needs to grow into the job (or jobs) and lay the institutional foundations of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). Only then can real policy be formulated and acted 
upon. Unfortunately for Catherine Ashton, media expectations are too high and the expectations of 
member states (who continue to curb her room for manoeuvre) are too low. As a consequence, 
many external partners are confused. The risk is that Ashton would ultimately fail to deliver and 
leave office before the end of her term, or be forced to do so (the European Commission president 
has a new prerogative of dismissal of members of the Commission). The hope is that the 
establishment of the EEAS would address some of these criticisms and clarify the responsibilities 
of the service and the role of High Representative itself. The High Representative can be 
considered a victim (and, at first, a result) of a power struggle among member states and between 
the Council and the Commission. The unanswered question is whether any Lisbon-created High 
Representative could ever be the Union’s foreign policy-maker, or whether s/he can only ever be an 
instrument in the machinery of European foreign policy-making. The current political reality of the 
EU does not in fact leave too much room for manoeuvre, as the divergence of views among 
member states is significant. It may be too soon to prejudge any outcome at this stage, before the 
EEAS is agreed to and established. Nevertheless, following the organisational setting up of the 
foreign service, the real challenge for the EU Foreign Policy Chief will be to actually devise a 
European Union foreign policy. 
A re-configured European Commission 
The new European Commission operates in a completely different environment now than was the 
case under Barroso I. First, there is no institutional pressure on the Commission following the 
Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force. It can once again be assertive. Second, the current economic 
situation is strongly impacting what is possible in the EU. Third, the new composition of the 
Commission is confusing, even if the distribution of portfolios would seem to be more effective. 
On the one hand, 15 of the 27 Commissioners have been in the College before; so ‘more of the 
same’ can be expected. On the other hand, there is now a treaty-based ‘first’ deputy President; 
following the Copenhagen conference on climate change there is a new Directorate General and a 
dynamic start from the Climate Action Commissioner (Connie Hedegaard); there are new powers 
in new and old policies, such as energy and justice and home affairs, which allow for greater 
activity. The unity of the College will also be tested; as the disagreements on the aftermath of the 
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has been established; the relationship between the three Commissioners (responsible for 
development, humanitarian assistance and enlargement and neighbourhood) and the European 
Foreign Policy Chief remain to be seen. Fifth, the power of the Commission president to dismiss 
fellow Commissioners gives President Barroso real supervisory clout over their performance. 
Barroso is consequently also responsible for their underperformance. The worry is that he might be 
susceptible to political pressure from outside the Commission, as has been the case in the past, 
when he came under fire for his lack of assertiveness during the financial crisis, for instance. Some 
hope that he will staunchly defend the single market from those European Council members who 
are overly-eager to reclaim sovereign powers.  
What needs to be regarded very positively is the Commission’s greater involvement with other 
institutions – as illustrated by meetings with the European Council President and the invitation of 
the European Parliament president to attend College meetings. The potential problem is the new 
need to redefine the position of the Commission president, since the Lisbon Treaty means that 
President Barroso is no longer the only individual operating in the ‘Union interest’. Whether he 
continues to act as a conciliator of divergent national interests (which is precisely the role conferred 
upon the POTEC) or whether he will move to promote the ‘Union interest’ as a whole remains to 
be seen. 
Empowered European Parliament 
The European Parliament elections last June brought a chamber composed almost a half of new 
faces. The legislature got off to a slow start, but as time passed and the new Lisbon powers came to 
the Parliament – it finally became as politically influential an institution as the Commission or the 
European Council. These new powers are in the areas of agriculture, judicial and police 
cooperation, delegated acts, criminal law and the ratification of international agreements, to which 
the Union is party. 
As in 2004, the European Parliament hearings to approve the Commission designates in 2010 
proved that the nomination process needs to be taken more seriously by member states and the 
Commission; there is no room for the rubber-stamping of unqualified candidates. The rejection of 
Bulgarian Commissioner Rumiana Jeleva illustrates this point. Second, the SWIFT
1 vote has put 
the chamber firmly at the centre of EU decision-making. One could argue that during the week of 8 
February – with the confirmation of the European Commission and the SWIFT vote in the 
Parliament in Strasbourg and the informal European Council meeting in Brussels – Strasbourg, not 
Brussels, was at the centre of European politics. What is certain is that the Parliament needs to 
mature and take more responsibility for the entire Union. The first indications are promising in this 
regard; the Parliament is now taken more seriously not only by other EU institutions, but also in 
Washington DC, for example. 
The fact that member states’ diplomats now need special permits to access the chamber symbolises 
the fact that the two co-legislators in the Union are now on an equal footing. The biggest worry in 
relation to the Parliament is its weaknesses: the party structures and, most importantly, its public 
legitimacy. It is up to this term of the Parliament to make the institution known and respected in its 
current incarnation, and pave the way for a less self-indulgent political culture. The legislature 
seems to have embraced the idea that it will be noticed more by citizens simply because of its new 
powers, but seems to have forgotten that it must make itself more relevant to voters. It will not 
achieve this through ‘communication’ of its activities, however, as useful as this exercise may be. 
Instead it must bring the electorate directly into the decision-making process by active engagement 
with the voters. A telling test will be if the voting public turns out in greater numbers in late spring 
2014 than it did in 2009.  
                                                      
1 On 11 February 2010 the European Parliament rejected an interim SWIFT agreement between the EU and 
the US on the transfer of citizens' financial data to prevent terrorist attacks> For more information see: 
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Re-engaged national parliaments 
National parliaments are the traditional victims of the transfer of competences to the European 
Union. First, decision-making in national capitals has become more restrained and more 
sophisticated, as the Union legislates on more issues than before. Second, when the national 
position on EU legislation is decided, the role of the executive is now much stronger that that of the 
national legislatures. New powers granted by the Lisbon Treaty to national chambers try to redress 
this balance.  
Whether and how national parliaments will engage further in the European decision-making 
process remains a mystery. What is certain for the moment is that there is an increasing momentum 
within the national parliaments’ bureaucracies towards making the ‘early warning’ system work. 
The testing experiences managed within the Conference of Community and European Affairs 
Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), the body set up to exchange ideas 
between national parliaments, proved in recent years that the system can work. The first challenge 
is to convince national parliaments to use it and use it not only for the purpose of blocking 
unwanted proposals, but also to engage them more in the pan-European debate and stimulate a 
national one. Another problem would be if the parliaments and their participation in the ‘early 
warning’ system became just a function of national government policy. However, the subsidiarity 
checks can potentially bring positive effects of a constitutional, democratic and political nature as 
well as increasing the transparency of EU legislation. Finally, would the new procedure generate a 
‘Mr. No’ capable of saying ‘No’ to Commission initiatives by mobilising a third of national 
parliaments on time? In other words, the new tool is a two-edged sword – it can mobilise national 
parliaments to engage in EU legislation more than previously, but it can also become a pawn in a 
cynical political game. 
European citizens neglected 
Citizens showed an yellow – not a red – card to Europe’s political class last June. The invisible 
wall that seems to divide European and national democratic arenas still stands. Governments treat 
the EU as a distinct sphere of policy-making rather than just another level of decision-making in 
which they are regularly involved. The institutions give the impression that they are either ignorant 
of or afraid of European citizens. The president of the European Council positions himself vis-à-vis 
other institutions and globally, but his gestures towards European citizens are, so far, few and far 
between. Although a relatively open administration, the Commission is still not treating civil 
society consultations seriously. The Parliament seems to have shelved all debate on legitimacy and 
participation until ahead of the next elections. In this climate of inertia, two things are happening. 
First, there are the massive protests in Greece in which the EU and Germany in particular are 
hammered as being responsible for the necessary cuts, not the Greek population or Greece’s 
political actors. Will the EU lose popularity in Greece and in other nations that would either have to 
pay for Greece or find themselves in a similar situation?  
Second, the European Commission has started the legislation process on the European Citizens 
Initiatives (ECIs) provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. All actors concerned are engaged: the 
Commission, the presidency, some other member states, the Parliament and civil society. Yet the 
major challenge posed by the ECIs is that paradoxically they may play a major role in alienating 
European citizens from EU integration, rather than creating a pan-European debate. How? If there 
was an ECI that the EU could legislate on, the Commission does not have to wait for 1 million 
signatures in order to act. Once it acts, it will take years before a final law is applicable on the 
ground. In the process, interest diminishes and many will be discouraged by the time delays. On 
the other hand, if the Commission refuses to take action, then a real debate could start – yet this 
time it would not be on what the EU can do for the citizen in the street, but how incapable and/or 
toothless the institution is. 
In the most extreme cases, the ECI will be used by extreme organisations as a tool to draw public 
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Commission has been considering this problem and has proposed a number of ‘quality control’ 
checks. However, the problem is not how not to allow the extremists to use the instrument, but why 
the extremists hold the views that they do. Hence, all ECIs should be addressed politically. Great 
responsibility lies with the European Parliament in this respect, as the only EU institution with a 
direct mandate from the public. The Parliament should become the guardian of the new instrument; 
all issues addressed through the ECIs should be addressed also by the Parliament; it could even 
support some of the ECIs by requesting that the Commission submit appropriate proposals (Article 
225 TFEU). So, in principle, the ECIs’ primary use will be for political purposes. They could, for 
example, be used by European political parties in the run-up to the European elections in 2014 to 
mobilise public interest and gather support. 
Conclusions 
The Lisbon Treaty provides for new political balances between the different institutions, but it is no 
substitute for political will. Whether the new political balances result in a substantive change 
depends mainly on the political decision-makers of the European Union. Having said that, what 
kind of political system has the new EU embraced? The new balance of power seems to be between 
the Parliament and the European Council; the first institution represents the ‘EU interest’ and the 
‘EU people’s voice’, and the other defends national interests and challenges the Commission on 
internal market rules. The Commission gave away part of the political initiative to the European 
Council and part of the political manifestation of the Union’s interests to the Parliament. But it 
remains a powerful executive and the defender of single market rules. Yet relations between the 
three heads – the presidents of the Parliament, Commission and the European Council – are 
smoother than ever before. At the same time, however, the fourth President – that of the Council – 
has been left out. The Council, with its rotating presidency, seems to be losing political initiative to 
all other actors. This may or may not backfire in the future when a more assertive rotating 
presidency takes over. The unknown quantity in the whole scenario remains the Foreign Policy 
Chief; but the least predictable animal is the collective voice of the national parliaments. Will the 
citizens of Europe like the new European Union any better? 